We should not be surprised to observe a universe compatible with life. If the universe were incapable of producing observers, no one would be here to observe it.
This is often called an anthropic or observer-selection effect.
This objection warns against treating our own existence as though it were an unbiased observation. Any observer necessarily finds himself in conditions where observers can exist.
That makes observer selection an important consideration in any argument based upon the life-permitting character of the universe.
The observation is correct: we could not observe a universe in which observers were impossible.
However, that fact does not by itself explain why life-permitting conditions exist. It explains why observers will only find themselves where such conditions occur.
The important question is therefore whether observer selection merely limits what we can observe or also provides an adequate explanation for the existence of the conditions being observed.
How much explanatory work can observer selection actually do? Does the fact that we could observe only life-permitting conditions remove the need to explain why such conditions exist at all?